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It's been a long time (5 years?) since I encountered this last. Despite the idea making total sense to me, I am no clearer than I was then on how to actually do this in any org I have been a part of or managed. Where does this work? How did you do it? Does it work?

I've worked on both sides and I really think it comes down to Dunbar's number [1] and thus the size of the company.

At a sufficiently small company, you can just trust people will generally do the right thing. I ask X to accomplish some compliance goal, I just trust that they'll do it right.

As the company scales, you actually know a smaller and smaller portion of the people you work with. You no longer just trust that they'll do the right thing, because you don't know them. You fix the lack of trust by adding processes that ensure the "right thing" happens, but each of those processes is a friction point. Eventually you have so many of those processes that they become the majority of the effort for a project.

That gets exacerbated by the usual turnover. People pissed off by all the processes they have to comply with will leave, and people who love having their own fiefdom will stay and double down.

That all ends in the evergreen stupidity of "spend $1,800 to have 12 people who make $150/hr argue about whether this app really needs a $5/month Aurora database".

That's a personal pet peeve, but is emblematic of the issue imo. Trust has broken down so severely that the company is willing to spend more than the lifetime cost of compute for the app to vet whether it's "necessary".

A similar vein is the "platform team" where all they do is take an open source project and wrap it in a custom DSL, so you get all the complexity and none of the searchability of the original project, plus the features are almost always a subset. I can't tell you how many times I've looked for solutions to a problem, found a snippet that will fix it, and then had to reverse engineer how to make a stupid DSL output that config.

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunbar%27s_number


IIRC the slides are from Google.

I think the ideas are solid but it's the C-suite that needs to deal with this and rarely cares. In other words, it's about organizational culture.


My overly simplistic take: it's all about incentives.

Usually they are structured in ways that can be gamed and the structure is defined by those that benefit most from them being gamed.

But then again, this is a view from the underbelly of corporate life and I may be missing something.


Simple but true. I think some famous people said something about this. I think true from every vantage point. I think this is also very compatible with the parent post. Some leadership are not very good at creating good incentives. Actually, I've never been in leadership but I suspect it's also just really hard and there's potentially external factors that obviate even the best incentives.

Yep mentioned in the original thread https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31727144

But TUIs make me feel smart, and my work feel important and esoteric.


Umm shouldn't that be "search the web and read the docs for pi4 to answer: ..."?


Weird then that they don't get it all correct.


> And please, God, let me die with my wife like John Nash did in that NJ Turnpike taxi crash.

amen brother.


+1, been all the way to fed ramp high and this is a huge part of the security theater that is fedramp.

The second best part is either getting really good at patching every single thing, or playing the POA&M game.


I did some work at a large saas company where HSM as a big part of what we did. In the early days, we paid for full HSMs that we managed and eventually had to make a decision on whether or not we would used managed HSM and HSM-like services like KMS across various cloud providers.

We did an analysis across all the HSM hardware vendors and found, unsurprisingly in hindsight, that all of these hardware vendors had all the same awful security practices as every other enterprise hardware vendor, and each had vulnerabilities that leaked private key material.

The conclusion was that cloud providers fronting managed HSM had more to lose than the hardware vendors did, and would be more likely to patch and address these kinds of issues.

What surprised me was my own reaction, I thought for sure managing our own HSM hardware had to be a better guarantee over the key material, but like many things, it turned out to be unscalable security theater.


Can you imagine ransomware that targets these logs?


Simply untrue.

There have been hundreds of MUD clients and many of them were not purely text based at all. Many had images and map screens built in.


MUDs are text based. Some of the clients can have graphical features but the basic way to interface with the MUD itself is with text.


HTTP is a text based protocol, nobody is arguing websites are muds.

Let's skip the strange purity tests and engage in good faith discussion.


Tho it wasn't unheard of for some MU* games to have ascii graphics in the telnet stream


People start talking to llms all day, suddenly text based games are interesting again...


So, formal verification then...


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