My initial reaction was that it didn't match my use. It doesn't seem possible to do what my use would require, which would be things like dropping specific identified privileges without affecting what other privileges the process might currently have. This would need some way for reading the process's current restrictions. The current API is write-only.
Moreover none of the privilege sets seemed to allow the possibility of chain loading once privileges had been dropped, as none of them allow execve(). OpenBSD tame() is, as its blurb states, not designed with the model in mind of programs where initialization parts (consider UCSPI servers, for example) are in a separate executable that then chain loads through common privilege dropping tools to the main part of the program.
It's not as easy to wrap tame() into some shell-level composable tool as it is to wrap jail() into the jexec tool.
Moreover none of the privilege sets seemed to allow the possibility of chain loading once privileges had been dropped, as none of them allow execve(). OpenBSD tame() is, as its blurb states, not designed with the model in mind of programs where initialization parts (consider UCSPI servers, for example) are in a separate executable that then chain loads through common privilege dropping tools to the main part of the program.
It's not as easy to wrap tame() into some shell-level composable tool as it is to wrap jail() into the jexec tool.