You have to remember the time constraint on drug profitability (~15 years for a US patent on a new molecular entity).
A new antibiotic would be held in reserve except in exceptional circumstances. Even if it was put to use on day one for extensively drug resistant TB and the like, there are too few patients to find a functional price point. It's sort of like the situation with many rare diseases.
My favored approach for solving this problem is using some sort of prize system (Sanders had a bill to do this for all drugs last year if you want to see a model). Effectively, the government offers $X billion for a new antibiotic meeting criteria Y and Z, ensuring that the private sector has financial incentive. In most plans, the drug IP would become public, allowing for immediate low cost generics.
You have to remember the time constraint on drug profitability (~15 years for a US patent on a new molecular entity).
A new antibiotic would be held in reserve except in exceptional circumstances. Even if it was put to use on day one for extensively drug resistant TB and the like, there are too few patients to find a functional price point. It's sort of like the situation with many rare diseases.
My favored approach for solving this problem is using some sort of prize system (Sanders had a bill to do this for all drugs last year if you want to see a model). Effectively, the government offers $X billion for a new antibiotic meeting criteria Y and Z, ensuring that the private sector has financial incentive. In most plans, the drug IP would become public, allowing for immediate low cost generics.