so basically to defend against password hacking they want to use FIDO/yubikeys.
Too bad if something like twitter happens your yubikey is probably useless after it would've prolly logged anything to their servers.
P.S.: it's possible to change passwords, but hardware keys need to be destroyed and changed.
Also Yubikeys can also have bugs. https://www.yubico.com/2017/10/infineon-rsa-key-generation-i...
So basically it's not more secure. even worse the more code you throw at a problem the more likely it is to be unsecure.
>Too bad if something like twitter happens your yubikey is probably useless after it would've prolly logged anything to their servers.
Like krupan also points out, this is flat out incorrect. The FIDO2 protocols are designed so that such a failure case is not possible, for two reasons. First, no secrets are shared - the server only sees _public_ keys and signatures. Second, a different public key is generated for each website - there is no globally correlatable identity.
accept that your public key is useless if twitter accidently logs challenges.
or even worse your hardware is useless if key generation is too weak.
or even more worse the protocol is so complex that chances are high that even implementations can contain bugs.
or ...
most engineers have trouble implementing simple logins with password. do you really think that having a complex system will be better?
>your public key is useless if twitter accidently logs challenges
No, this is also incorrect. That's not how public key cryptography works.
>your hardware is useless if key generation is too weak
This is true, which is why you choose an authenticator vendor that's widely trusted to make high quality hardware. If you don't trust Yubico, there are competitors.
>the protocol is so complex that chances are high that even implementations can contain bugs
This is only partly true - most of the complexity is in the browser and authenticator layers, and are implemented by cryptography experts in the browser teams and authenticator manufacturers. Almost all of the server layer complexity can be encapsulated in reusable open source libraries - app developers will only have to implement their business logic on top of it, just like they have to do for password authentication too.
>do you really think that having a complex system will be better?
It will eliminate the problems with phishing and password reuse. That is definitely better in my book.
This isn't a hypothetical discussion. Asymmetric encryption has been battle-tested for decades now. If it's as weak as you say, SSH and GPG would have gotten blown open long ago rather than being the the thing we all reach for when we wanted an actually unbreakable system.
Too bad if something like twitter happens your yubikey is probably useless after it would've prolly logged anything to their servers.
P.S.: it's possible to change passwords, but hardware keys need to be destroyed and changed. Also Yubikeys can also have bugs. https://www.yubico.com/2017/10/infineon-rsa-key-generation-i... So basically it's not more secure. even worse the more code you throw at a problem the more likely it is to be unsecure.