> And of course Dicey himself was not empowered with any special authority, but rather assembled a rational argument based primarily on historical precedent, which has subsequently been broadly accepted by figures in authority in the UK but is still, like everything else about our constitution, more a matter of convention than clear popular mandate.
Isn't that true of any such system? The US may have a written constitution, but that would be just a piece of paper if it weren't for the conventions surrounding it.
> Perhaps more importantly, if Parliament really is constitutionally sovereign, in the sense that its rules are supreme over all others and nothing a current parliament does can ever bind a future parliament, then we can never improve our system of government by adopting a formal written constitution, even if doing so would have overwhelming public support at the time. If you're going to make any argument about improving the constitution, starting from a foundation that necessarily precludes the single most important improvement that could be made might not be the best idea.
The statement is that Parliament is sovereign, not that Parliament necessarily ought to be sovereign. In practice I'm sure we could find a way to restrict the authority of parliament - the judiciary have already signalled some willingness to question the validity of laws if they undermine the integrity of parliament as a democratic body or basic human rights. But assuming we didn't, sure, we'd have to technically have a revolution, akin to the founding of the Fifth Republic in France. So what? Most countries have to redo their constitution every so often - it'd be very strange to expect a written constitution from hundreds of years ago to be appropriate for government today.
Isn't that true of any such system? The US may have a written constitution, but that would be just a piece of paper if it weren't for the conventions surrounding it.
Perhaps, but I think there is a profound difference in the legitimacy and authority of a system of government if there has at some point been a clear demonstration that the general public consent to it. The ideal might be a popular vote to accept the original constitution document, with a substantial majority in favour, and then some practical mechanism that allows any member of the public to cause a later change to the constitution if the consensus of their peers agrees with them. The important point is that the final authority on the system of government is the people being governed, directly.
In practice I'm sure we could find a way to restrict the authority of parliament - the judiciary have already signalled some willingness to question the validity of laws if they undermine the integrity of parliament as a democratic body or basic human rights.
According to our current constitution as generally accepted, the courts can't overrule the will of Parliament. That is parliamentary supremacy in action.
Human rights cases heard by our highest courts have typically come down to favouring an interpretation of statute law that is compatible with other statute law like the HRA in cases of ambiguity. It is understood that if Parliament clearly intends a new law to reduce the legal protection of human rights then our courts must follow that intent in their judgements.
After that, we're getting into some very fuzzy areas that come to the foreground with issues like Brexit or Scottish independence, but again the courts will enforce the will of Parliament (and by extension, the ability of Parliament to express its will).
I personally don't think either of those is necessarily a good thing, which is why I believe it could be better in the long term if we had a proper written constitution as many other states do, setting out the basic structure of our government and associated responsibilities, authorities and limits on power, with explicit popular consent to that form of government.
> The important point is that the final authority on the system of government is the people being governed, directly.
Well, the will of the people can't bind itself, so I'd say the current system reflects that pretty well.
> According to our current constitution as generally accepted, the courts can't overrule the will of Parliament. That is parliamentary supremacy in action.
Sure, but this is also, as you said, just a matter of convention and precedent. Jackson suggests the consensus has already shifted somewhat away from absolute parliamentary supremacy.
Isn't that true of any such system? The US may have a written constitution, but that would be just a piece of paper if it weren't for the conventions surrounding it.
> Perhaps more importantly, if Parliament really is constitutionally sovereign, in the sense that its rules are supreme over all others and nothing a current parliament does can ever bind a future parliament, then we can never improve our system of government by adopting a formal written constitution, even if doing so would have overwhelming public support at the time. If you're going to make any argument about improving the constitution, starting from a foundation that necessarily precludes the single most important improvement that could be made might not be the best idea.
The statement is that Parliament is sovereign, not that Parliament necessarily ought to be sovereign. In practice I'm sure we could find a way to restrict the authority of parliament - the judiciary have already signalled some willingness to question the validity of laws if they undermine the integrity of parliament as a democratic body or basic human rights. But assuming we didn't, sure, we'd have to technically have a revolution, akin to the founding of the Fifth Republic in France. So what? Most countries have to redo their constitution every so often - it'd be very strange to expect a written constitution from hundreds of years ago to be appropriate for government today.