I love the thought that went into this proposal and think the feedback mechanism to incentivize legislators thinking more concretely about the future (or give them a means to vote their conscience) is very interesting. I think two concerns haven't been raised yet by other comments. First, this proposal still doesn't seem to resolve the central problem: popularity or perceived future popularity of a policy are not necessarily linked to them being 'good' for the nation. Two examples: 1) What prevents a firm from buying LFPs close to maturity and running massive public relations campaigns to boost their popularity at the time of the vote? Larger corporations/industries lobby now with significant effect on legislative popularity, so this seems likely. The less confidence a legislator has that the "true" popularity will be reflected at the time of settlement, the more it incentivizes maximizing short term industry rent seeking/regulatory capture/etc. 2) There are a host of issues where I think the electorate is durably trending in a particular direction and that direction is bad. In contrast to your meat example, I don't want to buy LFPs in these because it endorses those views. If I believe popularity beyond the time horizon (eg 60 years) will be very different than before the time horizon I'm stuck with an incentive to buy (and thus lend support) to something I think is bad.

The second concern is: why doesn't this incentivize large wealth transfer programs that benefit the generation at t+40? Rather than create sustainability, it seems like you'd get escalating wealth transfers that would disadvantage current citizens to pay future ones.