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> It all began when my client, Matthew Herrick, a waiter-actor-model, exercised his right to leave an abusive and controlling relationship. His ex retaliated by impersonating Matthew on the gay dating app Grindr. Using Matthew’s picture and name, the ex would say Matthew had rape fantasies and then directly message with men to set up sex dates. Grindr’s patented geo-locating technology resulted in stranger after stranger going to Matthew’s home and the restaurant where he worked expecting sex. Some days, Matthew had as many as 23 visitors.

> By the time Matthew arrived at my office, exhausted and traumatized, he had already gotten an order of protection and reported the matter to the police 10 times. Yet, the flow of strangers—over a thousand at that point—wasn’t slowing. The unwitting strangers would wait for him in the stairwells at home, other times following him into the bathroom at work. “What about Grindr?” I asked. “They’re in the exclusive position to help.” Matthew said he had reported the matter to them 50 times.

If I ran a dating site, I'd jump all over this. Sure it's the right thing to do, but even from a business perspective having your platform appear to be a safe place would be important for gaining new members. If this account is remotely accurate I can't think of an explanation for this other than colossal incompetence or evil.



I don't understand how this would actually work with an impersonated account. The ex's account is going to geo-locate to the ex's phone, not to Matthew's; and the men are interacting with the fake account, not Matthew's actual account.


Faking your location is a thing.

Many apps try to block it, but that's whack-a-mole.

Other dating sites I have used allow this technology so you can find dates for holidays, or at home while you're away. I assume that's the reason, it could just be so that people in relationships can cast their net further afield, but that's also pure speculation.

Exposed and other tools make it difficult for apps to lock down any aspect of trust on a phone, returning control to the owner of the device. Sometimes this isn't the most desirable thing, but it's never the wrong thing.


Location can be easily faked, and apparently the impersonator would give the men the victim's home and work addresses.




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