>The stated ones, about NATO expansion, have backfired. But just because Moscow was stupid doesn’t also mean it was absolutely the aggressor.
I dont think you can stake this claim without understanding the objectives, the resolution of the war, and especially exploring the counterfactual from the Russian perspective.
It is easy to sit and the west and imagine that Russia regrets its actions deep down, but as bad as this outcome is, I think you have to ask if there are even worse outcomes that were considered from inaction.
This is a separate question from those about morality or aggressors, but one of realpolitik incentives.
Conversely, you can ask the same questions about the US failed wars in Vietnam and the middle east. Obviously many or most objectives were not met, but were enough met to better the counterfactual?
> It is easy to sit and the west and imagine that Russia regrets its actions deep down, but as bad as this outcome is, I think you have to ask if there are worse outcomes that were considered even worse from inaction.
I agree. Russia does not regret anything. Russia was carrying out genocide in Chechenya in late 1990s and early 2000s while the west was giving them free money in the form of development aid. The invasion of Georgia didn't see any reprecussions either, nor did the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 see any meaningful response.
If the west retreats, then this once again validates their strategy of expanding Russia with regional wars, and they will attack Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland next.
The western fear of escalation is escalating the wars, because it lowers the risk for Russia.
I dont think you can stake this claim without understanding the objectives, the resolution of the war, and especially exploring the counterfactual from the Russian perspective.
It is easy to sit and the west and imagine that Russia regrets its actions deep down, but as bad as this outcome is, I think you have to ask if there are even worse outcomes that were considered from inaction.
This is a separate question from those about morality or aggressors, but one of realpolitik incentives.
Conversely, you can ask the same questions about the US failed wars in Vietnam and the middle east. Obviously many or most objectives were not met, but were enough met to better the counterfactual?