1: verifies who the other party is and prevents MITM attacks.
2: encrypts the connection and prevents snooping
#2 still works fine, and for many people it's the only thing they care about since MITM attacks are quite rare, and if you typed the domain name yourself you don't need the verification either.
You can't securely exchange keys to do #2 without having #1.
Not sure why you think active attacks are more rare than any other attack against TLS/SSL sessions. Any time you are in a position to perform a passive attack (snooping) you could also perform an active attack (MITM). The only difference is which point-and-click attack tool you download.
Of course I can perform a MITM attack on a wireless network. You might try thinking about the communication layers above PHY. Almost any of them will do.
Agreed the certificate provider mentioned is a fraud, but so is Veritas, who issued a certificate identifying some random person as microsoft.com a few years ago.
Governments need to regulate, and audit, certificate providers, and financially punish them for failing audits.
Now that Firefox has explicit support for key continuity management, I think I'll just dump my root CA store and go with that. Global PKI is just not such a great idea.