A solution definitely ought to be found. Google putting up a few millionths of a percent of their revenue or so towards fixing the bugs they find in ffmpeg would be the ideal solution here, certainly. Yet it seems unlikely to actually occur.

I think the far more likely result of all the complaints is that Google simply completely disengages from ffmpeg and stops doing any security work on it. I think that would be quite bad for the security of the project - if Google can trivially find bugs at a high speed such that it overwhelms the ffmpeg developers, I would imagine bad actors can also search for them and find those same vulnerabilities Google is constantly finding, and if they know that those vulnerabilities very much exist, but that Google has simply stopped searching for them upon demand of the ffmpeg project, this would likely give them extremely high motivation to go looking in a place they can be almost certain they'll find unreported/unknown vulnerabilities in. The result would likely be a lot more 0-day attacks involving ffmpeg, which I do not think anyone regards as a good outcome (I would consider "Google publishes a bunch of vulnerabilities ffmpeg hasn't fixed so that everyone knows about them" to be a much preferable outcome, personally)

Now, you might consider that possibility fine - after all, the ffmpeg developers have no obligation to work on the project, and thus to e.g. fix any vulnerabilities in it. But if that's fine, then simply ignoring the reports Google currently makes is presumably also fine, no ?

I really don’t understand whole discourse us vs them? Why it is should be only Google fixing the bugs. Isn’t if volunteers not enough, so maybe more volunteers can step up and help FFMpeg. Via direct patches, or via directly lobbying companies to fund project.

In my opinion if the problem is money, and they cannot raise enough, then somebody should help them with that. Isn’t it?

If widely deployed infrastructure software is so full of vulnerabilities that its maintainers can't fix them as fast as they're found, maybe it shouldn't be widely deployed, or they shouldn't be its maintainers. Disabling codecs in the default build that haven't been used in 30 years might be a good move, for example.

Either way, users need to know about the vulnerabilities. That way, they can make an informed tradeoff between, for example, disabling the LucasArts Smush codec in their copy of ffmpeg, and being vulnerable to this hole (and probably many others like it).

> they shouldn't be its maintainers.

I mean, yes, the ffmpeg maintainers are very likely to decide this on their own, abandoning the project entirely. This is already happening for quite a few core open source projects that are used by multiple billion-dollar companies and deployed to billions of users.

A lot of the projects probably should be retired and rewritten in safer system languages. But rewriting all of the widely-used projects suffering from these issues would likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

The alternative is that maybe some of the billion-dollar companies start making lists of all the software they ship to billions of users, and hire some paid maintainers through the Linux or Apache Foundations.

> abandoning the project entirely

that is a good outcome, because then the people dependent on such a project would find it plausible to pay a new set of maintainers.

We'll see. Video codec experts won't materialize out of thin air just because there's money.

> But FFmpeg does not have the resources to fix these at the speed Google is finding them.

Google submitting a patch does not address this issue. The main work for maintainers here is making the decision whether or not they want to disable this codec, whether or not Google submits a patch to do that is completely immaterial.

What makes you think the bad actors aren't already finding these bugs? From the looks of it, there isn't really any rocket science going on here. There are equally well-funded bad actors who will and do find these issues.

With Google finding these bugs, at least the user can be informed. For this instance for example, the core problem here is the codec is in *active use*. Ffmpeg utilizes a disingenuous argument that it's old and obscure, but omits the fact that it's still compiled in meaning that an attacker can craft a file and send it to you and still works.

A user (it could be a distro who packages ffmpeg) can use this information to turn off the codec that virtually no one uses today and make their distribution of ffmpeg more secure. Not having this information means they can't do that.

If ffmpeg doesn't have the resources to fix these bugs, at least let the public know so we can deal with it.

Also, just maybe, they wouldn't have that many vulnerabilities filed against them if the project took security more seriously to begin with? It's not a good sign for the software when you get so many valid security reports and just ask them to withhold them.