not to mention: you can host a chat server in your company network, somewhat protected from random people on the internet, and your ops people should already be securing that from external intrusions anyway.
I'm mixed on this. It's undeniably true if everyone is in the same building but in my experience this is rarely actually true as people need to work from home, use mobile devices, other offices open, partnerships or acquisitions happen, etc. That tends to lead to people requesting holes in firewalls or using VPNs as a sort of aftermarket spray-on security measure, which inevitably makes things much worse because now you have exposed services[1] which were setup and operated by people whose threat-model was “Sheltered internal service accessed by trusted staff”. It's much better to start with the assumption that your services are exposed to the internet and secure them accordingly.
1. VPNs are almost always terrible for security because people tend to get them for one need (i.e. email, one line of business app, etc.) but when their computer gets compromised the attacker now has access to the superset of everything which every VPN user has ever needed to access and in all likelihood a bunch of other things which were never intended to be exposed but were never adequately firewalled internally.