I never published them, but I proved various extensions to the theorem back in the day. Giving the ordinal voters more options doesn't help in the slightest. And if you have some ordinal and some cardinal voters, the cardinal voters taken together wind up as a dictator.
Where it really gets interesting is when you reinterpret the result into other contexts. For example, suppose you're trying to reconcile several different decision-making systems -- e.g., different moral codes. Those are like different voters in Arrow's system, and hence there may be no "rational" way to reconcile them other than simply adopting one of them (which would be the "dictator" in the theorem's terms).
Where it really gets interesting is when you reinterpret the result into other contexts. For example, suppose you're trying to reconcile several different decision-making systems -- e.g., different moral codes. Those are like different voters in Arrow's system, and hence there may be no "rational" way to reconcile them other than simply adopting one of them (which would be the "dictator" in the theorem's terms).