If anything, hopefully this highlights the weaknesses that many digital systems have, to intervention from those in the analogue world (like courts), who seem blissfully unaware of the ease with which documents like this can be forged. And similarly for those willing to accept such unauthenticated documents and blindly trust anything that vaguely looks official and arriving by email.
Similar processes are in place for other (very systems, and paper based processes don't protect against this. We have the technology to avoid this (digital signatures), and yet they are not used!
A good reason to ensure that systems are built securely on the assumption upstream providers (including DNS) can be compromised by an adversary, regardless of how much you may think you trust the provider. If someone cares enough, they'll get certificates issued under your domain by doing something like this. Adding more lines of defence certainly makes sense to prevent this - don't let DNS, and ultimately emailed bits of paper, become your single point of failure for confidentiality in a system!
dark.fail used to host up-to-date links to many major darknet sites hosted on the tor network. The attacker kept the site online with minor changes and now anyone who visits these links will have the connection go through MITM proxies and their credentials stolen. It's difficult to understand why namecheap hasn't at least shut down the domain after days of this going on.
Very unfortunate that Namecheap isn’t cooperating. Not really sure what the hold up is, some say it’s related to the Namecheap vs. Tucows lawsuit [0], but realistically it wouldn’t make much sense to do something like this out of spite. I wonder if they’re worried about potential legal obligations of turning over such a “controversial” domain?
I think they should protest. Not all of the contents made accessible via the page was even illegal, and the page itself is not illegal. Law enforcement shouldn't expect to always get more surveillance tools than they need.
> Not all of the contents made accessible via the page was even illegal
Would you say the same if 30% of the links on the site were to child pornography? Why does it matter that some of the links on the page were to legit content? DDW did the same and was still shut down by the DOJ.
> and the page itself is not illegal
I doubt that there are many places in the world where getting paid to distribute links to darknet drug markets isn’t illegal. The US certainly isn’t one of those places.
> BONUS 3: If @Namecheap is claiming the court order is correct, they must believe that the German court has themselves put up a phishing site.
There'd be nothing surprising about this. It isn't a point in favour of the court order being "fake".
When the takeover of Hansa [0], a collaboration between German and Dutch LE, happened they did actually alter the code of the website in ways identical to phishing. Collecting usernames, passwords, and location information.
Similar processes are in place for other (very systems, and paper based processes don't protect against this. We have the technology to avoid this (digital signatures), and yet they are not used!
A good reason to ensure that systems are built securely on the assumption upstream providers (including DNS) can be compromised by an adversary, regardless of how much you may think you trust the provider. If someone cares enough, they'll get certificates issued under your domain by doing something like this. Adding more lines of defence certainly makes sense to prevent this - don't let DNS, and ultimately emailed bits of paper, become your single point of failure for confidentiality in a system!