If anything, hopefully this highlights the weaknesses that many digital systems have, to intervention from those in the analogue world (like courts), who seem blissfully unaware of the ease with which documents like this can be forged. And similarly for those willing to accept such unauthenticated documents and blindly trust anything that vaguely looks official and arriving by email.
Similar processes are in place for other (very systems, and paper based processes don't protect against this. We have the technology to avoid this (digital signatures), and yet they are not used!
A good reason to ensure that systems are built securely on the assumption upstream providers (including DNS) can be compromised by an adversary, regardless of how much you may think you trust the provider. If someone cares enough, they'll get certificates issued under your domain by doing something like this. Adding more lines of defence certainly makes sense to prevent this - don't let DNS, and ultimately emailed bits of paper, become your single point of failure for confidentiality in a system!
Similar processes are in place for other (very systems, and paper based processes don't protect against this. We have the technology to avoid this (digital signatures), and yet they are not used!
A good reason to ensure that systems are built securely on the assumption upstream providers (including DNS) can be compromised by an adversary, regardless of how much you may think you trust the provider. If someone cares enough, they'll get certificates issued under your domain by doing something like this. Adding more lines of defence certainly makes sense to prevent this - don't let DNS, and ultimately emailed bits of paper, become your single point of failure for confidentiality in a system!